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Should the Treasury Price-Discriminate?
A Procedure for Computing Hypothetical Bid Functions
by
DANIEL HELLER AND YVAN LENGWILER*
Ever since FRIEDMAN [1959], it has been debated whether the Treasury should
sell bonds in a uniform or in a discriminatory auction. Empirical research on this
topic has been confined to experiments in which both auctions were used. But
these experiments inherently contain an identification problem, since differences
cannot be attributed to the auction format alone. We develop a method for gener-
ating counterfactual data on discriminatory auctions, using real data from uni-
form-price Treasury bond auctions in Switzerland. Our method allows us to inves-
tigate the performance of the two auctions without relying on experiments and
without the identification problem. (JEL: D 44, H 63)
1 Introduction
For decades, governments have been auctioning off fixed-income securities to fi-
nance their debt. Despite the importance of Treasury auctions in terms of value,
so-called multi-unit auctions have so far received fairly little academic attention.
While auction theory has been a prolific field in economics, it has focused mostly
on single-unit auctions such as auctions for a painting, a contract, or drilling rights
to an oil field. Multi-unit auctions are different in that the good being auctioned is
divisible. Starting with WILSON [1979], it has been shown in a number of papers
that the conclusions reached in single-unit auction theory do not necessarily carry
over to multi-unit auctions, see BACK AND ZENDER [1993], NOUSSAIR [1995],
TENORIO [1997], LENGWILER [1998], ENGELBRECHT-WIGGANS AND KAHN
[1998a], [1998b].
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In practice, Treasuries apply two kinds of formats for auctions of fixed-income
securities, namely discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. In a discriminatory
auction a bidder pays the bid price if the bid price is above or equal to the cutoff
price set by the Treasury. In a uniform-price auction, a bidder pays the cutoff price
conditional on having submitted a bid that was equal to or higher than the cutoff
price. In most countries, bidders are allowed to submit multiple price–quantity
pairs.
Considerable attention has been given to the question of which auction format
yields greater revenues for the Treasury. BIKCHANDARI AND HUANG [1993] pro-
vide a survey of this controversy. Until recently, discriminatory auctions for bonds
were used more often than uniform auctions, but many countries have been ex-
perimenting with their auction formats. Until now, quantitative research on the
question of which format is more lucrative for the Treasury has used data from pe-
riods in which the Treasury applied the two different auction formats, either simul-
taneously or sequentially. Yet, all of these experiments suffer from a fundamental
identification problem, since observed differences may not be wholly attributable
to the auction format.1 
In this paper, we present a computational procedure for transforming the aggre-
gat  bid function of a uniform-price auction into a corresponding bid function that
would have been submitted under price discrimination. This allows us to compare
the two auction formats even if no (quasi- or even true) experiments are available.
Thus, we avoid the identification problem inherent in the experiments done so far.
As an illustration of our method we apply the procedure to the Swiss data. This
allows us to determine which auction rule would have been more advantageous
for the Swiss Treasury. We identify a statistically significant advantage of the uni-
form over the discriminatory auction format.
2 Constructing Hypothetical Bid Functions
2.1 Theory
An early model that is especially relevant for Treasury auctions is SMITH [1966].
NAUTZ [1995a] further developed this model by deriving the equilibrium bid func-
tions. Our method for computing hypothetical bid functions builds upon this work,
so we will briefly present the Smith–Nautz model.
Let there be a finite price grid P: = {p1, … , pj, … , pk}. Prices are indexed in
increasing order, 0 < p1 < … < pj < … < pk. Every bidder i submits a bid function
bi: P ® R+ indicating the amount of debt he wishes to purchase at each price 
1 Good experimental design requires random assignment to experimental conditions that
are the same in every regard except for the manipulation of interest. To date, this requirement
has been violated by all Treasuries that have carried out trials with auction formats. Hence, it
would be more appropriate to describe these tests as quasi-experiments than as experiments.
See section 2.3 below for a more extensive discussion of this identification problem.
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on the  grid P.  From these  bids, the aggregate  bid functionis  defined as 
B(p): =ibi(p). It is important to note that the submited bids may deviate from
true wilingness to pay, since bidders do not have to reveal their true preferences.
Let di: + +denote the true demand function.2We assume that diis a strictly
decreasing, invertible function. As before, D(p): =idi(p). After the auction, the
seler announces a cutof price. Al bids associated with prices weakly greater
than wil be met, so B() is the number of bonds sold to the bidders.
In a uniform-price auction, al accepted bids are fulfiled at the cutof price. For
each unit of debt bidders purchase, they pay only the cutof price, even if their bid
price is greater. Thus, the government’s revenue is simply
(1) R(): =B().
Note that this is just like the revenue function of an ordinary monopolist. The gov-
ernment chooses the cutoff  price in such a  way that it can raise the amount  of
funds that it wants to. Let Sdenote this amount. In general, there wil be more than
one cutof price that satisfies this condition. For instance, if Bis not “too con-
vex,” then Ris single-peaked, and there  wil  be two ’s that  yield the targeted
amount of funds. In this case, the government chooses the higher price, because
this is associated with the issue of fewer government bonds.3
In aprice-discriminating auction, a bidder pays the price at which he submited
a bid, even if the cutof price is lower. To distinguish between the equilibria of the
two auction formats, a tilde wil denote the endogenous variables in a price-dis-
criminating auction only. Accordingly, the government’s revenue is 
(2)
with B˜(pk+1): = 0.
When submiting their bids, the bidders do not know the cutof price that wil
result. This uncertainty is captured by some distribution function Ffrom which 
is drawn (or in the case of a discriminatory auction, ˜is drawn from F˜). It is as-
sumed that bidders are individualy negligible and therefore none of them, on its
own, can afect the seler’s chosen cutof price. As a consequence, bidders take F
or F˜as  given.  Let f(pj): =F(pj)–F(pj–1) for j> 1 and f(p1): =F(p1), and
likewise for the distribution of the price in the discriminatory auction.
Within this setup, NAUTZ[1995a] characterizes optimal bidding in both auction
formats. With a few slightly  diferent assumptions,  Nautz’s result can  be some-
what simplified. First, we assume that al prices on the price grid have some prob-
ability of being chosen as the cutof price, i. e., f(pj) > 0 and f˜(pj) > 0 for al j.

(˜˜): (˜( )–˜ ( ),
˜
R p Bp Bpj
p
j j
j


=
≥
+∑ 1
2In other words, diis the inverse function of the marginal wilingness to pay.3There is a  maximum  of funds that can  be raised,  given a  bid function,  namely 
S¯: = max B(). If the target Sexceeds S¯, then  no cutof  price can satisfy the  govern-
ment’s financial needs.
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This is, in fact, not a strong assumption, because we can always fix the price grid
in such a way that it is contained in the support of the distribution of the price.
Second, we do not restrict bidders to using decreasing bid functions. This assump-
tion alows us to use simple unconstrained maximization. At least for the empirical
application we provide, this, too, is not a very strong assumption, because, as we
wil see in section 3.4, this constraint actualy never binds empiricaly. These as-
sumptions imply the folowing simplification of Nautz’s result.
Proposition 1(NAUTZ[1995 a]): In a uniform-price auction, each bidder isubmits
his true demand function as a bid, bi(pj): =di(pj), for alj. In a price-discriminat-
ing auction, bidderi’s bid function is given by
(3)
for al j> 1, and b˜i(p1): =di(p1).
The folowing intuition is behind this result. Consider the discriminating auction
first. Price discrimination can be seen as the government’s atempt to extract the
consumer surplus. Yet, bidders wil try to avoid the extraction of this surplus and
wil behave diferently in a price-discriminating auction than they do in a uniform-
price auction (SMITH[1966]). According to equation (3), the bid shading that can
be  observed in a  discriminating auction is the result  of  precisely this atempt:
Bidders try to save some of the consumer rent by bidding weakly at high prices.
Bidding is  more straightforward in the  uniform-price auction.  Consider a  bid
that is diferent from the true demand at some price pj. If turns out to be difer-
ent from pj, the bid amount is irelevant for this outcome. Yet, if turns out to be
equal to pj, the bidder wil not receive his utility-maximizing quantity, which is
di(pj), but the quantity he bid, bi(pj). So the bidder does not stand to gain by mis-
representing his demand. As a consequence, he wil optimaly reveal his true wil-
ingness to pay.
This result is in sharp contrast to the colusive equilibria under uniform pricing
found by WILSON[1979] and further developed by BACK ANDZENDER[1993] and
WANG ANDZENDER[1999]. In their  models,  bidders submit a steeper  demand
function than their true preference in order to “make room for weaker bidders” and
thus yield a lower cutof price. But this result hinges crucialy on the assumption
that the Treasury wil auction of a quantity of bonds that is known in advance.
This assumption is, however, inappropriate for Swiss Treasury auctions, since
the government has the right to adjust the supply of bonds after having examined
the bids. This uncertainty about the supply of bonds in an auction has recently at-
tracted a considerable research efort. Several studies find that the highly colusive
equilibria are not robust to supply uncertainty. The ability of the seler to adjust the
supply to the  bidding  mitigates colusion (NYBORG[1997],  LENGWILER[1998],
BACK ANDZENDER[1999],  PAVA N,  LICALZI, ANDGILLI[1999],  MCADAMS
˜( ): ( – ) (˜ )(˜ ) ( )–
–b p d p p p Fpf p d bi j i j j j
j
j
i j= +



÷
<1 1
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[2000]). Thus, it is doubtful that the collusive equilibria are relevant to our appli-
cation. LENGWILER [1998] considers a model which is similar to the Smith–Nautz
model, except that no perfect competition is assumed, i.e., bidders do not treat the
distribution of the cutoff price as given. Moreover, it is assumed that the seller can
adjust the supply elastically after knowing the bids. Interestingly, the equilibrium
bid functions in this model approach the result presented above in proposition 1 as
we increase the number of bidders indefinitely. Thus, we may interpret the
Smith–Nautz model as the limit of a multi-unit auction with perfectly elastic sup-
ply (and therefore supply uncertainty) and “almost competitive” bidders.
2.2 The Treasury’s Decision Problem
Since the purpose of a bond auction is raising funds to finance debt, the Treasury
should choose the auction format that enables it to do so at the lowest possible
cost. The cost of paying back the debt is proportional to the number of bonds is-
sued. Therefore, it is optimal for the Treasury to choose the auction format that
provides the same revenue with the smaller number of bonds. In other words, the
government’s choice is min {B (p), B˜ (p˜)}, subject to R (p) > S and R˜ (p˜) > S,
with S being the amount of funds raised in the auction. Which format is better de-
pends, of course, on the bid functions B and B˜. More specifically, it depends on the
way agents shade their bids in the discriminating auction. Suppose bidders report-
ed their true willingness to pay in a price-discriminating auction, i.e., they did not
shade (in this case, B = B˜). Then the price-discriminating auction would clearly be
better for the government, because it would offer a means of collecting the entire
consumer surplus. Yet, as proposition 1 establishes, bidders do shade, and in fact,
they shade precisely in order to keep some of the consumer surplus. Hence, choos-
ing between uniform pricing and price discrimination involves a trade-off for the
government. In the uniform-price auction, bidding is strong, but the government
cannot collect the consumer surplus. In a price-discriminating auction, the govern-
ment collects at least some of the rent, but bidding is weak due to shading. From a
theoretical point of view, it is not possible to determine a priori if the advantage of
rent collection outweighs the loss due to shading. Hence, we will investigate the
question empirically.
2.3 Empirical Comparison of the Two Formats
The best and probably most accurate way to compare auction formats empirically
would be an auction in which the participants do not know which format the
Treasury will choose. Thus, they would be required to submit two bid functions,
one for each format. By comparing these bid functions, we would then be able to
find the best format for the Treasury. To our knowledge, however, no such experi-
ment has ever been performed.
The experiments that Treasuries have been performing fall into one of two cate-
gories. In one sort of experiment, the Treasury first performs a series of auctions
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using one format, and then switches to the other. The Bundesbank, for instance,
followed this route in 1988 when it switched from uniform-price to discriminatory
auctions for its repo contracts (NAUTZ [1995b]), Zambia made the same move
with foreign exchange auctions (TENORIO [1993]), and Mexico switched from
price discrimination to the uniform-price format for the auctions of its government
debt (UMLAUF [1993]). The other sort of experiment is to use the two auction 
formats simultaneously, but to use them for securities with different characteris-
tics. This is the approach of the Norwegian Treasury (BERG et al. [2000]). In
Norway, government bonds are sold in uniform-price auctions, but government
bills are sold in price-discriminating auctions. The U.S. Treasury used to apply
discriminatory auctions only, but it did a small experiment auctioning some secur-
ities with uniform-price auctions in the 1970s (SIMON [1994]), and it repeated this
experiment on a much larger scale in the 1990s (MALVEY, ARCHIBALD, AND
FLYNN [1995], NYBORG AND SUNDARESAN [1996], MALVEY AND ARCHIBALD
[1998]).4
However, both types of experiments have the same problem. They do not reveal
information on the outcome of a particular auction that would have occurred under
a different format. Since in one case (the German, Mexican, and Zambian experi-
ments) the bid functions are submitted at different points of time, we do not know
whether the differences can be attributed to the auction format or to some un-
known exogenous shock. The results are also not comparable if price discrimina-
tion is used for one kind of fixed-income securities and uniform pricing for an-
other kind (as in the U.S. and Norwegian experiments). Empirically observed dif-
ferences do not necessarily stem from the auction format; they may, for instance,
also be caused by shocks to the preferences for different maturities.
Here, we propose an indirect computational method that allows us to empirical-
ly compare the two common multi-unit auction formats. This method is based on
the theoretical considerations laid out in section 2.1; its core consists of the deriva-
tion of hypothetical bid functions that would have occurred if the other auction
format had been used. Our data cover only uniform-price auctions, because this is
the only format used by the Swiss Treasury. Our strategy is to use these data to
generate the distribution F˜ of the cutoff price p˜ if price discrimination had been
used. Once we have F˜, we can apply proposition 1 and transform the observed bid
function, B, into a hypothetical one, B˜, describing how bidders would have be-
haved if the Treasury had been price-discriminating. Finally, we compare the ob-
served cost that the government actually incurred in financing its debt with the
cost that it would have had to bear had it used the discriminatory auction.
4 Recently, the U.S. Treasury has decided to discontinue the price-discriminating auction
format. All federal debt is now auctioned using the uniform-price format. Milton
Friedman’s suggestion has finally been adopted, more than 40 years after he made it!
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5 Because the variance of prices on financial markets is not constant over time, there is a
potential heteroskedasticity problem. This problem is not easy to address here, because the
time between observations is not constant.
2.4 Estimating F˜ and Constructing B˜
In the theoretical sections above, we have seen that the density function F˜ plays a
crucial role in determining how agents shade their bids in a discriminatory auc-
tion. What do we know about F˜? Because different Treasury bonds are close sub-
stitutes, the price of a bond in a primary auction must in some way be related to
the prices of the bonds that are traded in the secondary market. It seems reasonable
to assume that every bidder closely follows the prices on the secondary market to
extract a signal about the cutoff price that is about to be set by the Treasury. A bid-
der is not going to submit a bid at a price that he considers too high relative to
what he would have to pay for a similar bond in the secondary market. In this way,
the bid functions in the auctions will tend to shift depending on secondary-market
conditions. One way to capture this nexus is
(4) pz = a + b pzs + ez,
with z indicating one of the auctions of the sample.5
The cutoff price p is equal to the sum of three components. The constant a is a
price wedge between primary and secondary market. The price p s is the price at
whi h a bond with the same characteristics (same time to maturity, same coupon,
same callability) is traded on the secondary market just before the auction takes
place. The final price component is an error term e; it stems from the Treasury’s
discretion, which is unknown to the bidders. In addition to the secondary market, a
bidder could also use other information to extract a signal about the cutoff price –
for instance, the prices in the when-issued market. But all this information should
already be contained in the secondary-market prices. Thus, equation (4) should
give us an accurate picture of the expectations of the agents, and the error term e in
this equation should give us an estimate of the extent of uncertainty.
According to proposition 1, the bid functions observed in the Swiss uniform-
price auction, Bz , are the true demand functions. If we knew the probability distri-
bution of the cutoff price chosen by the Treasury under a price-discriminating re-
gime, F˜z we could apply (3) and compute the shaded bid functions B˜z . However,
since there have been no price-discriminating Treasury bond auctions in
Switzerland, we cannot compute F˜z directly.
We proceed as follows: We estimate (4) based on data from all auctions z.
Assuming a normal distribution of the error term, we take the estimated standard
deviation of e, as well as the estimates for a and b to generate Fz (one for each
auction z). Using (3), we then compute the bid function B˜z
1 that would have been
realized in the price-discriminating auction if the bidders expected p˜z to be distrib-
uted according to Fz. Next, we take B˜z
1 to determine the cutoff price p˜z1, which is
the cutoff price that would have raised the amount Sz of funds. Of course, p˜z1 is not
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distributed according to Fz , so the two are not compatible. Hence, we need to iter-
ate this procedure in the following way: 
pz = a0 + b0 pzs + ez0 Þ Fz Þ B˜z1 Þ p˜z1,
p˜z1 = a1 + b1 pzs + ez1 Þ F˜z1 Þ B˜z2 Þ p˜z2,
A
p˜zn = an + bn pzs + ezn Þ F˜zn Þ B˜zn +1 Þ p˜zn +1,
A
As this process converges, it leads to pairs of bid functions and distributions, (B˜z
n ,
F˜z
n), that are more and more compatible with each other. In the limit, it gives us
the outcome of hypothetical price-discriminating auctions.6
We stop the iteration when
(5)
The left hand side is the maximum absolute change in the number of bonds neces-
sary to raise an amount Sz, across all auctions z. We keep on iterating as long as
this maximum change exceeds some smalld.
3 Application: The Auction of Swiss Treasury Bonds
3.1 The Auction Procedure for Swiss Government Bonds
The Swiss Treasury has always only used the uniform-price format in its auctions.
The following paragraphs describe the auction design that is applied by the Swiss
Treasury for bonds in more detail.
The auctions for bonds take place on a bimonthly basis. Shortly before the auc-
tion, the Treasury announces the characteristics of the bonds that are to be issued,
such as time to maturity, coupon, and callability. The Treasury also states the max-
imum number of bonds that will be issued. Usually, however, much fewer bonds
than this maximum number are sold in the auction. The Treasury also reserves the
right to cancel an auction if it does not consider the bids satisfactory.
Like other Treasuries, the Swiss Treasury frequently chooses not to issue a new-
ly designed bond, but instead decides to extend the volume of a previously issued
series (reopening). In such cases, the new bonds have exactly the same character-
istics (coupon, maturity, callability) as a previously issued series. For reasons ex-
plained later, we will use only the data on such reopenings.
 
max ˜ ( ˜ ) – ˜ ( ˜ ) .
z
z
n
z
n
z
n
z
nB B+ + <1 1p p d
6 Note that the reverse procedure is much simpler. If data from a price-discriminating
auction are available, (3) can be used directly to compute the true demand and therefore the
equilibrium bid function of a uniform-price auction (subject to the validity of the Nautz
model). No iteration is needed in this case. HORTACSU [2000] pursues this strategy in a
Wilson-type model, which is a common-value model with fixed supply.
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The bidders are invited to submit as many price–quantity bids as they wish. The
price components of the bids have to be on a five-cent grid. In addition to submit-
ting price–quantity pairs, bidders may place pure quantity bids without a price.
These unpriced bids have to be less than 100,000 Swiss francs each. Unpriced bids
are relatively unimportant. They account for about 7.2% of the total amount sold
in an average Treasury bond auction.
The bids have to be in by 12o’clock noon on the day of the auction. Until spring
2001, the bids were submitted by fax; then the Treasury switched to a proprietary
electronic platform. After all the bids have been submitted, the Treasury decides
on the cutoff price. All bids greater than this price, as well as all unpriced bids, are
fully satisfied. Since the Treasury also sets an upper bound on the number of
bonds it will issue, rationing of bids submitted at the lowest winning price may oc-
cur. In recent years, however, rationing has become less frequent, since the an-
nounced upper bounds have been substantially increased.
The circle of bidders is restricted to institutions holding accounts with the Swiss
National Bank (SNB), currently some 400 entities. Under the current regulation,
these are all banks based in Switzerland. All bidders are treated equally, i.e., there
are no primary dealers. Also, no fee is charged to the participants.
3.2 The Data Set
The characteristics of Treasury bonds that have been issued in Switzerland in the
last few years vary widely: Times to maturity range from 2 to 50years, most bonds
are not callable, some include one or several call options. Often, there is no bond
with exactly the same characteristics traded on the secondary market at the time of
the auction. One way to deal with this problem is to first estimate a zero-coupon
yield curve and then to use this curve to determine the price that the to-be-auc-
tioned bond would obtain on the secondary market. This approach would allow us
to correct for different maturities and coupons, but it fails if some of the bonds are
callable.
In order to avoid this problem, we consider only reopenings and exclude initial
public offerings. A bond auctioned in a reopening has exactly the same coupon,
the same date of maturity, and the same call options as a previously issued bond
that is still traded on the secondary market.7 We operationalize ps as the secon-
dary-market price of such a previously issued bond at 11o’clock a.m. on the day
of the auction, just one hour before the bidding window closes. This price should
contain almost all the public information available about the value of the to-be-is-
sued bond. Our sample covers all reopenings between October 1993 and
June 2000, a total of 56 observations.
7 Reopenings are especially popular in smaller countries, since they deepen the market
and increase its liquidity.
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3.3 Application of the Nautz Model to Swiss Treasury Auctions
Our method for computing the hypothetical bid functions under price discrimina-
tion is subject to the validity of NAUTZ’s [1995a] model. This model builds on two
key assumptions. One is that each bidder is individually small, and thus does not
take the effect of his behavior on the seller’s decision into account. The other is
that the demand functions are independent of each other, indicating that the
bidders’ valuations for Treasury bonds are private values. We address these as-
sumptions in the above order.
The assumption of competitive behavior may look like a tall order in the Swiss
market: It is true that between 20 and 30 bidders usually participate in the auc-
tions, but despite this significant number, a few large Swiss banks typically buy
between two-thirds and three-quarters of each issue. Nonetheless, there are three
good reasons to consider the Swiss Treasury auction competitive.
First, previously issued government bonds are actively traded on the secondary
market, and they provide close substitutes for the bonds that are being issued with
the auction. This is especially true for reopenings, because exactly the same secur-
ity is already available on the secondary market.
S cond, the market is highly contestable, as the only requirement for participat-
ing is to have the status of a bank. But many banks do not usually participate in the
auctions. Thus, if established bidders were able to extract large rents from the auc-
tions, it would be worthwhile and very easy for the banks that typically do not par-
ticipate to outbid the established participants. Thus, the scope for oligopolistic be-
havior is limited. In fact, no episodes of market cornering or collusion are known
in the Swiss Treasury market.
Third, as we mentioned above, the ability of the seller to adjust the supply in re-
sponse to the bidding strongly works against collusion. The fact that the Treasury
does not ex ante commit to a specific quantity severely constrains the bidders’
ability to affect the Treasury’s chosen cutoff price. If bidding is weak, the Treasury
is not forced to accept a low cutoff price. Since the Swiss Treasury always tends to
hold a substantial amount of spare liquidity, it can simply reduce the number of
bonds issued in such a case. In fact, the Treasury even has the discretion to cancel
an auction altogether if it deems the bids unsatisfactory – an event that has oc-
curred once in the last six years.
The assumption of private values, which is built into the Nautz model, may also
seem problematic at first sight. Private values are not an obvious choice for a mod-
el of a financial market. After all, many bidders buy in order to resell. Consider a
slightly more elaborate description of the demand functions featured in the model
used in section 2.1. We can write them as di (p, m, si), where m is some public in-
formation about market conditions (and thus about the value of the government
bond), and si is some private information. The function di captures the (true) de-
mand of investor i as a function of these public and private signals, and of the
price that has to be paid for the bonds. We argue that the private signals are of mi-
nor importance in our context, simply because the public information that is avail-
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able is so good, especially for the reopenings that we use in the estimation. More
specifically, the secondary market price of the to-be-issued bond can definitely be
considered to be public information. In fact, let us assume that all the public infor-
mation, m, is contained in the secondary-market price, so m: = ps. This publicly
observable signal contains a great deal of information about the resulting price of
the auction, as can be established by regressing p s on p (estimating (4)). This re-
gression yields an adjusted R2 of 99.4%.8 Therefore, private signals cannot have a
large influence on an individual bidder’s expectation.
3.4 Qualitative Results
In the empirical application of the procedure described in section 2.4 we set
d: = 0.01, indicating an accuracy of the computation of bonds issued worth
10,000Swiss francs. Convergence is achieved after eight iterations. The generated
B˜-functions are decreasing for all 56observations, so that we can say with some 
certainty that the constraint on the bidders to use downward-sloping bid functions
imposed by NAUTZ [1995a] is empirically irrelevant for the Swiss Treasury bond
auctions. As an illustration, figure 1 shows the process of convergence for a sample
auction.
HARRIS AND RAVIV [1981, 1488] mention a set of empirical and experimental
findings that relate to our hypothetical bid functions. They find:
“1. The mean bid is larger under the competitive than under the discriminating auc-
tion.
2. The variance of bids is larger under the competitive auction.
3. The evidence regarding the comparison of seller’s revenue under the two types of auc-
tions is inconclusive.” 
Point 1 is a corollary to proposition 1, and since our hypothetical bid functions sat-
isfy this proposition by design, they also satisfy Harris and Raviv’s first point. In
fact, the hypothetical bid functions are strictly below the original bid functions for
each of the 56auctions, which implies that the mean bid is lower in each of the hy-
pothetical price-discriminating auctions. Point 2 applies to our computed hypo-
thetical bid functions because these functions always turn out to be flatter than the
original bid functions in the uniform-price (or “competitive”) auction. Thus, the
variance of the bids under price discrimination, as we have computed them, is
smaller than that of the bids under the uniform-price auction (figure1 shows this
clearly). The fact that the bid functions in the hypothetical price-discriminating
auctions reflect these empirical findings should provide some confidence in the
validity of the computation procedure used to generate those bid functions. Our
8 The regression also yields a constant (a) and a slope (b ) that are statistically indistin-
guishable from zero and one, respectively, establishing that p s (= m) is an unbiased signal
for p . More precisely, a is estimated to be – 0.080 with standard error 1.331, and b to be
1.0004 with standard error 0.013.
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computation does not, however, produce the same inconclusive results indicated
by point 3, i.e., we are able to rank the two auction forms with respect to their rev-
enue implications. The next section discusses this aspect.
3.5 Quantitative Results
Table 1 contains all the results necessary for the comparison of the performance of
the two auction rules. It features the price signal of the secondary market, p s; the
price realized in the uniform-price auction, p ; the number of bonds issued, B (p);
and the amount of funds raised, S (= p B (p)) .9 It also includes the cutoff price
9 B (p) as in table1 is simply the quantity of bids at or above the cutoff price. It can de-
viate from the number of bonds that were actually issued for two reasons. First, we disre-
gard unpriced bids. We do so because our theory makes no prediction about why anyone
would submit such bids. For this reason we have no description of such bidders’ behavior in
a price-discriminating auction. Second, we also disregard rationing of the lowest accepted
class of bids, which occasionally occurred. Both omissions are of minor importance.
Figure 1
Bid Functions (Right) and Density of Expected Cut-Off Price (Left) of a Sample Auction,
Original Data, First Four Iterations, and Final Estimate 
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Table 1
Comparison of Actual and Simulated Auctions
Obs p s p B (p) S p˜ B˜ (p˜) p˜ – p B˜ (p˜) – Advan-
B (p) tage
uniform
1 98.65 98.70 768.60 758.61 98.06 773.17 –0.64 +4.57 +0.59%
2 98.60 98.50 172.25 169.67 97.90 173.14 –0.60 +0.89 +0.52%
3 93.50 92.50 147.50 136.44 92.24 147.65 –0.26 +0.15 +0.10%
4 94.56 94.45 712.50 672.96 93.90 716.12 –0.55 +3.62 +0.51%
5 99.15 99.10 867.15 859.35 98.51 871.93 –0.59 +4.78 +0.55%
6 97.95 97.60 755.00 736.88 97.16 757.74 –0.44 +2.74 +0.36%
7 105.96 105.80 142.00 150.24 105.25 142.69 –0.55 +0.69 +0.49%
8 99.95 99.60 954.00 950.18 99.15 957.50 –0.45 +3.50 +0.37%
9 106.75 106.00 145.20 153.91 105.60 145.49 –0.40 +0.29 +0.20%
10 99.90 99.65 474.60 472.94 99.16 476.74 –0.50 +2.14 +0.45%
11 103.40 103.30 274.50 283.56 102.72 275.77 –0.58 +1.26 +0.46%
12 95.60 95.75 260.00 248.95 95.05 261.70 –0.70 +1.70 +0.65%
13 114.98 114.70 389.00 446.18 114.15 390.51 –0.55 +1.51 +0.39%
14 103.88 103.10 175.50 180.94 102.80 175.82 –0.30 +0.31 +0.18%
15 107.35 107.35 818.55 878.71 106.73 823.09 –0.62 +4.55 +0.56%
16 108.28 108.50 723.00 784.46 107.73 727.93 –0.77 +4.93 +0.68%
17 103.75 100.25 170.10 170.53 100.20 169.49 –0.05 –0.61 –0.36%
18 101.30 101.30 462.20 468.21 100.67 464.77 –0.63 +2.57 +0.56%
19 106.28 106.00 118.00 125.08 105.50 118.45 –0.50 +0.45 +0.38%
20 101.10 101.10 778.10 786.66 100.49 782.48 –0.61 +4.38 +0.56%
21 103.82 103.80 506.50 525.75 103.19 509.35 –0.61 +2.85 +0.56%
22 111.50 111.60 501.00 559.12 110.87 504.14 –0.73 +3.14 +0.63%
23 101.50 101.10 79.00 79.87 100.67 79.30 –0.43 +0.30 +0.38%
24 105.40 105.30 849.50 894.52 104.71 854.09 –0.59 +4.59 +0.54%
25 105.72 105.60 699.01 738.16 105.04 702.52 –0.56 +3.51 +0.50%
26 98.60 98.50 242.40 238.76 97.92 243.54 –0.58 +1.14 +0.47%
27 106.87 106.90 305.20 326.26 106.25 306.99 –0.65 +1.79 +0.59%
28 105.47 105.45 878.53 926.41 104.84 883.32 –0.61 +4.79 +0.55%
29 103.78 103.45 726.63 751.10 103.00 729.28 –0.45 +2.64 +0.36%
30 100.61 100.60 1079.50 1085.98 99.98 1085.53 –0.62 +6.03 +0.56%
31 111.73 111.50 294.70 328.59 110.96 295.93 –0.54 +1.23 +0.42%
32 100.65 100.35 452.00 453.58 99.86 453.76 –0.49 +1.76 +0.39%
33 103.40 103.10 300.60 309.92 102.63 301.81 –0.47 +1.21 +0.40%
34 104.53 104.50 219.00 228.86 103.88 220.24 –0.62 +1.24 +0.56%
35 99.52 100.75 68.02 68.53 99.25 69.05 –1.50 +1.03 +1.51%
36 105.29 105.40 302.55 318.89 104.70 304.54 –0.70 +1.99 +0.66%
37 92.75 92.75 93.00 86.26 92.08 93.50 –0.67 +0.50 +0.53%
38 97.80 97.90 585.20 572.91 97.24 589.20 –0.66 +4.00 +0.68%
39 96.75 96.80 516.15 499.63 96.17 519.50 –0.63 +3.35 +0.65%
40 100.72 100.90 605.12 610.56 100.18 609.53 –0.72 +4.41 +0.73%
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computed for the hypothetical price-discriminating auction p˜ and the number of
bonds that would have to have been issued in this auction in order to raise S funds,
namely B˜ (p˜). The next two columns show by how much the price and the quantity
issued differ for the two formats. As one would expect, the discriminatory auction
always has a lower cutoff price than the uniform-price auction. The last column re-
ports by what proportion the Treasury has fared better using the uniform-price
than using the discriminatory price auction format, i.e., the percentage by which
B˜ (p˜) exceeds B (p).
The results demonstrate that, in the past, price discrimination would not have
decreased the Treasury’s cost. On the contrary, in all except one auction it would
have required the Treasury to issue more bonds in order to collect the same
amount of funds, so the uniform-price auction does have an advantage for the
Treasury. Whether this difference is significantly larger than zero can be tested in
various ways.
Since for every reopening we have one observation for each auction format,
B˜ (p˜) and B (p ) are two dependent samples. A common test for difference in such
a case is a dependent-sample t-test. The null hypothesis under this test is that the
average advantage of one of the auction formats is equal to zero. Given our obser-
vations for B˜z (p˜z) and Bz (p z), we are able to reject the null hypothesis (t = 10.41).
Table 1
(Continued)
Obs p s p B (p) S p˜ B˜ (p˜) p˜ – p B˜ (p˜) – Advan-
B (p) tage
uniform
41 101.46 101.50 505.07 512.65 100.86 508.04 –0.64 +2.97 +0.59%
42 101.55 101.50 429.54 435.98 100.91 431.79 –0.59 +2.25 +0.52%
43 100.08 100.00 347.32 347.32 99.41 349.25 –0.59 +1.93 +0.56%
44 93.00 92.40 194.50 179.72 92.06 194.85 –0.34 +0.34 +0.18%
45 98.85 98.40 200.18 196.98 98.00 200.82 –0.40 +0.64 +0.32%
46 100.20 100.30 299.14 300.03 99.60 301.03 –0.70 +1.90 +0.63%
47 95.35 95.10 351.80 334.56 94.60 353.05 –0.50 +1.25 +0.35%
48 99.90 99.80 257.50 256.99 99.23 258.79 –0.57 +1.29 +0.50%
49 97.90 97.30 337.75 328.63 96.95 338.30 –0.35 +0.55 +0.16%
50 97.96 98.40 197.42 194.26 97.50 199.10 –0.90 +1.68 +0.85%
51 99.15 99.30 484.70 481.31 98.60 487.76 –0.70 +3.06 +0.63%
52 98.80 99.20 303.60 301.17 98.34 306.20 –0.86 +2.60 +0.86%
53 101.60 101.20 423.52 428.60 100.76 424.18 –0.44 +0.66 +0.15%
54 102.65 103.00 895.67 922.54 102.15 902.82 –0.85 +7.15 +0.80%
55 102.75 103.10 511.30 527.15 102.25 515.44 –0.85 +4.14 +0.81%
56 102.70 103.10 368.81 380.24 102.22 371.80 –0.88 +2.99 +0.81%
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Hence, the uniform auction is significantly better for the Treasury than the dis-
criminating.
The use of the t-test presupposes the normal distribution of the differences
between samples. Since it is unclear whether this assumption is valid, we can also
check with a nonparametric test. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test al-
so leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (t = 6.43) – this despite the lower
power of nonparametric tests.
Furthermore, we can also consider the following regression:
(6) B˜z (p˜z) – Bz (p z) = a + b · Bz (p z) + errorz
where z denotes some auction. The left-hand variable is the number of bonds that
must be issued in a price-discriminating auction in excess of what is issued in the
uniform-price auction. The null hypothesis is that the uniform price and the dis-
criminating price auctions are cost-equivalent, implying that both coefficients, a
and b, are zero. This hypothesis can be rejected based on an OLS regression of (6);
see table 2. The absolute term a is not significantly different from zero, but the
slope coefficient b is clearly positive. The size of the slope implies that the price-
discriminating auction would have increased the government’s debt finance cost
by 0.58%.
4 Conclusions
The question of which auction procedure the Treasury should use is the subject of
ongoing debate. In this paper we have shown that theory alone cannot settle this
question, nor can any of the empirical experiments carried out to date.
In an attempt to determine which auction format is better, some Treasuries have
been running experiments using both auction methods. From an experimental de-
sign point of view, all of these past experiments are flawed, since differences in
performance cannot be clearly attributed to changes in the auction format, either
because the two auction formats are used at different points in time, or because
they are used for different types of securities at the same point in time. Until now,
researchers have been constrained to the use the data from such experiments to in-
vestigate this question.
Table 2
Testing for Cost Equivalence
Coefficient Estimate Std. error t-statistic Prob {H0}
a –0.2169 0.19770 –1.10 0.227
b +0.0058 0.00039 15.02 0.000
Note: Adj. R2 is 0.80.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
? 
13
1.
15
2.
21
1.
59
 F
ri,
 0
2 
M
ar
 2
01
8 
10
:5
6:
29
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 M
oh
r S
ie
be
ck
428 JITE 157Daniel Heller and Yvan Lengwiler
In this paper, we develop a method for comparing the performance of the two
auction formats even when no experiments are available. Our method allows us to
generate the hypothetical bid functions that would have occurred under price dis-
crimination using data that have been observed in uniform-price auctions only.
Our method is therefore not subject to the identification problem inherent in the
available experimental data.
Using our computation procedure, we conclude that the uniform-price auction has
a statistically significant advantage over the price-discriminating auction in
Switzerland. Compared to the price-discriminating auction, it reduces the
government’s debt financing cost by more than half a percentage point. Thus, the
Swiss Treasury has wisely chosen to use the uniform-price format for all its auctions.
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